America’s Longest War The United States And Vietnam, 1950-1975 6th Edition by George Herring -Test Bank

 

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America’s Longest War, 6e (Herring)

Chapter 3   Limited Partnership: Kennedy and Diem, 1961-1963

 

1) Upon taking office, President John Kennedy met the challenges of the Cold War by

1.   A) ordering a buildup of nuclear weapons, modernizing conventional forces, and developing counterinsurgency capabilities.

2.   B) withdrawing from American defense commitments such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).

3.   C) opening relations with the People’s Republic of China.

4.   D) pursuing Detente with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  A

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2) Throughout his tenure in office, Kennedy

1.   A) eagerly took up the burden in Vietnam.

2.   B) chose a cautious middle course that expanded America’s role in Vietnam but kept it limited.

3.   C) swung wildly from a desire to shed America of its Vietnam commitment to an insistence on deploying massive numbers of troops to that nation.

4.   D) pursued a negotiated solution in South Vietnam.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  B

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3) In 1961, the Kennedy administration confronted Cold War crises in all of the following places EXCEPT

1.   A) Laos.

2.   B) Berlin.

3.   C) The Congo.

4.   D) India.

5.   E) Cuba.

 

Answer:  D

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4) Vietnam assumed a position of greater importance in the eyes of the Kennedy administration in 1961 because

1.   A) Khrushchev’s speech in support of wars of national liberation appeared to presage more aggressive Communist behavior in the developing world.

2.   B) Kennedy had become increasingly concerned about the steadily growing Communist insurgency in rural South Vietnam.

3.   C) Vietnam appeared to be a better place than Laos to make a stand against Communism in Southeast Asia.

4.   D) setbacks in Laos and at the Bay of Pigs increased the symbolic importance of thwarting Communism in Vietnam.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  E

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5) The Taylor-Rostow Mission of 1961 recommended all of the following EXCEPT

1.   A) a massive commitment of American combat troops.

2.   B) the deployment of an 8,000-man “logistical task force” to serve as a symbol of American intentions under the guise of flood relief.

3.   C) increased American military and economic assistance.

4.   D) the commitment of highly trained American advisors to help the South Vietnamese government better combat the Communist insurgency.

5.   E) improved training for Civil Guard and Village Self-Defense Corps troops.

 

Answer:  A

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6) After receiving the Taylor-Rostow report, Kennedy opted to

1.   A) deploy the “logistical task force” General Taylor had first proposed.

2.   B) expand the Laos negotiations to include Vietnam.

3.   C) begin regular bombing attacks against North Vietnam.

4.   D) publicly announce that his administration was washing its hands of South Vietnam.

5.   E) approve a limited commitment of aid and advisers.

 

Answer:  E

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7) The strategic hamlet program included

1.   A) land reform.

2.   B) the provision of schools and medical facilities to isolated villages.

3.   C) the relocation of peasants to isolate them from the National Liberation Front (NLF).

4.   D) the reinstitution of village elections.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  E

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8) American assistance to the South Vietnamese military in 1962 included all of the following EXCEPT

1.   A) chemical defoliants.

2.   B) helicopters.

3.   C) biological weapons.

4.   D) armored personnel carriers.

5.   E) hundreds of aircraft.

 

Answer:  C

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9) At the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, South Vietnamese forces

1.   A) used their advanced weapons and mobility to decisively defeat a well-armed NLF battalion.

2.   B) suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a better-equipped Viet Cong force.

3.   C) failed to destroy a Viet Cong unit despite air and artillery support and a ten-to-one superiority in men.

4.   D) occupied a deserted village that the guerrillas had long since abandoned.

5.   E) impressed their American advisors with their great bravery under fire.

 

Answer:  C

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10) The strategic hamlet program

1.   A) succeeded in protecting the villagers of South Vietnam from attacks by Chinese insurgents.

2.   B) was skillfully implemented by the Diem government.

3.   C) turned the tide in the struggle for the control of rural South Vietnam.

4.   D) failed to provide sufficient security for village residents.

5.   E) greatly interfered with the NLF’s efforts to infiltrate rural villages.

 

Answer:  D

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11) During 1962, reporters such as David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan

1.   A) agreed with Ambassador Frederick Nolting and General Paul Harkins that the U.S. had stemmed the Communist tide in South Vietnam.

2.   B) questioned the importance of containing Communism in South Vietnam.

3.   C) argued that the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments were losing the war.

4.   D) called on the Kennedy Administration to expand the war by bombing North Vietnam.

5.   E) pressed successfully for direct negotiations between Hanoi and Washington.

 

Answer:  C

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12) The Hilsman-Forrestal report of early 1963

1.   A) occupied a middle ground between critical press reports and optimistic embassy assessments.

2.   B) agreed with the conclusion of reporters such as David Halberstam that the U.S. was losing the war.

3.   C) argued for wholesale changes in American policy.

4.   D) called for the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem.

5.   E) urged Kennedy to commit American combat formations to South Vietnam.

 

Answer:  A

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13) Friction between the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments in the spring of 1963 was highlighted by

1.   A) Diem’s demand that the U.S. remove all of its advisers from South Vietnam.

2.   B) Sporadic fighting between U.S. advisers and South Vietnamese soldiers.

3.   C) U.S. insistence that Diem step down in favor of his brother, Ngo DinhNhu.

4.   D) Ngo DinhNhu’s public proposal that the U.S. withdraw 5,000 men from South Vietnam.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  D

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14) According to the author, the 1,000-man troop withdrawal proposal that the Kennedy Administration debated in 1963 was

1964.         A) part of JFK’s secret plan to end American involvement in South Vietnam following his reelection in 1964.

1965.         B) the first step in the phased withdrawal of American forces made possible by the defeat of the Viet Cong.

1966.         C) a sign that Kennedy understood the failure of America’s effort in Vietnam.

1967.         D) a political ploy to reassure Diem that the U.S. was not trying to take over his government.

1968.         E) All of these.

 

Answer:  D

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15) Following the incident of May 8, 1963 in Hue, Buddhist monks and their supporters protested the Diem government by

1.   A) staging highly publicized self immolations and mass protests.

2.   B) waging guerrilla war.

3.   C) openly allying with the Viet Cong.

4.   D) assassinating high officials and burning down government buildings.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  A

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16) On August 21, 1963, the Diem government

1.   A) reconciled with the Buddhists.

2.   B) demanded that the U.S. pull its troops out of South Vietnam.

3.   C) refused to promise outgoing Ambassador Frederick Nolting that it would not take further repressive actions against the Buddhists.

4.   D) launched raids on pagodas in Saigon and other cities resulting in the arrest of over 1,400 monks.

5.   E) opened negotiations with North Vietnam aimed at effecting a political solution to the ongoing war with the NLF.

 

Answer:  D

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17) The controversial August 24, 1963 cable to incoming Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

1.   A) strongly reaffirmed unqualified American support for the Diem government.

2.   B) argued that the U.S. needed to end its commitment to South Vietnam.

3.   C) indicated that the U.S. would back a coup if Diem refused to depose his brother Nhu.

4.   D) called for Lodge to press Diem mildly for democratic reforms.

5.   E) urged that American advisers be permitted to take part in combat.

 

Answer:  C

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18) In the fall of 1963 the Buddhist crisis and the emerging rift with the Diem government led the Kennedy Administration to

1.   A) give serious consideration to ending America’s commitment to South Vietnam.

2.   B) drift toward backing a coup in South Vietnam despite sharp divisions among top policymakers.

3.   C) open direct negations with Hanoi aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis in South Vietnam.

4.   D) support enthusiastically a French neutralization proposal for South Vietnam.

5.   E) contemplate a massive American invasion of North Vietnam.

 

Answer:  B

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19) According to the author, French President Charles de Gaulle’s neutralization proposal

1.   A) constituted a lost chance to avoid American involvement in the Vietnam War.

2.   B) was part of a clever Soviet ploy designed to trap the U.S. into a no-win situation.

3.   C) won Kennedy’s full support after he concluded that America could not achieve its objectives in South Vietnam.

4.   D) had little chance of success given the lack of interest either side had in meaningful negotiations.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  D

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20) The Kennedy Administration’s move in October 1963 to recall CIA Station Chief John Richardson and to make selective cuts in the aid it provided to South Vietnam

1.   A) indicated strong continued American support of Diem.

2.   B) failed to have an impact in Saigon.

3.   C) signaled American support for a coup d’état by South Vietnamese generals.

4.   D) was only a slap on the wrist designed to appease domestic critics angry at Diem’s repression of the Buddhists.

5.   E) prompted Ngo DinhNhu to seize power in a bloodless coup.

 

Answer:  C

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21) With his top advisers sharply divided in October 1963 between those who continued to support Diem and those who advocated his removal, Kennedy

1.   A) sided strongly with Diem supporters such as General Paul Harkins.

2.   B) unequivocally backed those who sought Diem’s removal from power.

3.   C) ignored Vietnam in disgust.

4.   D) pursued a truly even-handed compromise policy.

5.   E) followed a compromise policy that ensured support for a coup against Diem.

 

Answer:  E

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22) In the aftermath of the November 1, 1963 coup d’état, Diem and Nhu

1.   A) left South Vietnam for exile under a promise of safe conduct.

2.   B) were brutally murdered in the back of an armored personnel carrier.

3.   C) fled from South Vietnam with the help of sympathetic American officials such as Ambassador Lodge.

4.   D) committed accidental suicide.

5.   E) escaped into the jungles of South Vietnam to join the National Liberation Front.

 

Answer:  B

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23) During his time as president, John F. Kennedy

1.   A) reduced America’s commitment to South Vietnam.

2.   B) neither increased nor reduced substantially America’s commitment to South Vietnam.

3.   C) set in motion a plan for a complete withdrawal from South Vietnam.

4.   D) increased America’s commitment to South Vietnam dramatically.

5.   E) bravely pursued a neutralist solution to the problem of South Vietnam at great political cost.

 

Answer:  D

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24) Kennedy’sMiddlePath:The1961DecisiontoCommitAdvisors- First, review the Taylor-Rostow Mission section of Chapter 3 of America’s Longest War.

 

Then read item 210, Letter from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President, and the first attachment to that letter, Paper Prepared by the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) at the following link:

 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d210.

 

Then read this excerpt from the November 11, 1961, Rusk-McNamara Report to Kennedy: https://vietnam.vassar.edu/documents/doc7.html.

 

Next, open the following link and scroll down to and read item 239, Letter From the Ambassador at large (Harriman) to the President, and its attachment, Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador at large (Harriman):

 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d239.

 

Finally, open the following link and scroll down to and read item 272, National Security Action Memorandum No. 111: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d272.

 

1.   What general and specific recommendations did General Maxwell Taylor make to President Kennedy? Which of Taylor’s proposals do you think was the most controversial? Why?

 

1.   According to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, what national interests were at stake for the United States in South Vietnam? How did these officials hope to achieve America’s objectives in South Vietnam?

 

1.   Into what two categories did Rusk and McNamara divide American forces operating in South Vietnam? What problems do they believe would accompany the deployment of Category (B) units? What do these concerns suggest about their attitude toward Taylor’s recommendation for the commitment of an American military Task Force to South Vietnam?

 

1.   What course of action did W. Averell Harriman argue would best achieve America’s goals in South Vietnam? On what earlier international agreement did he propose basing this initiative?

 

1.   How did Harriman’s proposal differ from either Taylor’s or Rusk and McNamara’s recommendations?

 

1.   What course of action did Kennedy ultimately implement through National Security Action Memorandum 111? How did this program differ from Taylor’s recommendations? How did it differ from Harriman’s suggested approach?

 

1.   Given the options available to Kennedy, do you think he made a wise choice regarding Vietnam in the fall of 1961? What policy would you have pursued?

 

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25) TheThousandManTroopWithdrawal- First, read Tim Weiner’s overview of the debate over whether Kennedy’s proposed removal of 1,000 American troops from South Vietnam was part of a secret withdrawal plan:

 

http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/23/us/kennedy-had-a-plan-for-early-exit-in-vietnam.html.

 

Next, read the minutes of President Kennedy’s April 4, 1963, meeting with British counterinsurgency expert R.G.K. Thompson: http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/viet3.htm.

 

Then read both the Summary Record of the October 2, 1963, National Security Council (NSC) Meeting, and National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 263:

 

http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/viet8.htm, http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/viet14.htm.

 

Next, read the White House’s U.S. Policy on Vietnam Statement dated October 2, 1963: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/state63.htm.

 

Finally, read this transcript of Kennedy’s last press conference:

 

http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/viet23.htm.

 

1.   What was R.G.K. Thompson’s assessment of the war in April 1963? Explain.

 

1.   Under what circumstances did Thompson recommend withdrawing 1,000 American advisers from South Vietnam? What benefits did he argue would accrue from such a withdrawal?

 

1.   What objections did Kennedy have at the October 2, 1963, NSC meeting to the wording of the draft public statement? Why? What does this suggest about the President’s commitment to the 1,000-man withdrawal plan?

 

1.   Why do you think Kennedy ordered that no formal announcement be made of the 1,000-man withdrawal plan in NSAM-263? Does this suggest he had a secret plan to withdraw from Vietnam? Why or why not?

 

1.   What did the October 2, 1963, White House Statement say about the troop withdrawal? Did this statement make a withdrawal of 1,000 soldiers inevitable, or did it imply contingencies? Explain.

 

1.   What did Kennedy’s comments at his final press conference suggest about the troop withdrawal?

 

1.   In light of these documents, do you think that the 1,000-man troop withdrawal proposal was part of a secret plan that Kennedy had to extricate America from Vietnam? Explain. Is there a more plausible explanation for the President’s desire to remove some of the troops from South Vietnam?

 

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America’s Longest War, 6e (Herring)

Chapter 5   On the Tiger’s Back: The United States at War, 1965–1967

 

1) The United States’ approach to fighting the Vietnam War

1.   A) related American military power to building an effective Vietnamese government.

2.   B) was consciously designed to inflict the maximum number of civilian deaths possible.

3.   C) assumed that applying its superior military power would achieve victory.

4.   D) was more political than military in nature.

5.   E) greatly overestimated North Vietnam’s military strength.

 

Answer:  C

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2) The Rolling Thunder bombing campaign

1.   A) had no impact on North Vietnam.

2.   B) inflicted about $600 million in damage to North Vietnam.

3.   C) severely crippled South Vietnam’s agriculture.

4.   D) completely disrupted the infiltration of men and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

5.   E) crippled North Vietnam’s well-developed munitions industry through massive strikes.

 

Answer: E

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3) The Johnson Administration’s decision to pursue a gradualist approach to the air war permitted North Vietnam to do all of the following EXCEPT

1.   A) establish a nuclear weapons program.

2.   B) build a powerful air defense system.

3.   C) implement alternative transportation systems.

4.   D) protect critical resources.

5.   E) persist in the war despite the damage the U.S. was inflicting.

 

Answer:  A

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4) The USSR began to provide North Vietnam with substantial military assistance beginning in 1965 because

1.   A) it hoped to tie the U.S. down in Southeast Asia so that unopposed Soviet forces could pursue opportunities in Europe and the Middle East.

2.   B) an American defeat in Southeast Asia would set the stage for a real thaw in the Cold War.

3.   C) Moscow wished to prevent America from establishing a strong position on the border of its close fraternal ally, China.

4.   D) assistance to North Vietnam would prove Soviet credibility in the face of hostile Chinese propaganda.

5.   E) None of these.

 

Answer:  D

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5) How did Beijing assist North Vietnam in its war with the U.S.?

1.   A) Its fighter aircraft intercepted American attack planes over the Tonkin Gulf.

2.   B) It sent “volunteers” to join People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units fighting in South Vietnam.

3.   C) It provided huge amounts of supplies, munitions, as well as 320,000 troops.

4.   D) Chinese divisions engaged American Marines along the Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

5.   E) It threatened to invade Taiwan.

 

Answer:  C

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6) The Rolling Thunder air war did which of the following?

1968.         A) It resulted in the loss of over 950 American aircraft between 1965 and 1968.

1969.         B) It only further stimulated the infiltration of men and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

1970.         C) It gave U.S. Special Ops the opportunity to liberate prisoners of war in Hanoi.

1971.         D) Cost the United States $1.00 for each $10 of damage inflicted.

1972.         E) Robbed Hanoi of a tremendous propaganda advantage.

 

Answer:  A

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7) Through his Search and Destroy strategy, General William Westmoreland

1.   A) abandoned the U.S. Army’s traditional, conventional approach to warfare in favor of a small-unit counterinsurgency strategy.

2.   B) sought to lure North Vietnamese units into populated areas where the U.S. could easily cause their destruction.

3.   C) pursued a typical, conventional strategy designed to eliminate the military threat to South Vietnam.

4.   D) avoided engaging enemy main force units in favor of police activities designed to uproot and destroy the NLF’s political apparatus.

5.   E) launched an entirely novel tank-led invasion across the DMZ into North Vietnam.

 

Answer:  C

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8) President Lyndon Johnson’s “many flags” campaign to secure troop commitments to Vietnam from America’s Pacific allies

1.   A) was a resounding success that resulted in large numbers of allied troops joining American forces in South Vietnam.

2.   B) met with sympathetic responses from Eastern European nations of the Warsaw Pact.

3.   C) was publicly supported by American allies, but did not result in the commitment of any soldiers.

4.   D) was a disappointment that resulted in the deployment of only 71,000 troops.

5.   E) sparked unrest and near mutiny among American troops.

 

Answer:  D

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9) American forces used which of the following in Vietnam?

1.   A) apple computers programmed to map directions for troops.

2.   B) nerve gasses such as Agent Orange designed to destroy civilians.

3.   C) massive air support including napalm and B-52 raids.

4.   D) huge amounts of submarine deployments.

5.   E) humvee vehicles to guard against IUDs.

 

Answer:  C

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10) From 1965 to 1968, North Vietnam

1.   A) matched American escalations by sending more troops south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

2.   B) sought to engage in traditional, set-piece battles in which its forces could decisively defeat the Americans.

3.   C) proved unable to match the massive American escalation that took place between 1965 and 1968.

4.   D) sought to minimize combat with the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces so as to keep its casualties down.

5.   E) None of these.

 

Answer:  A

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11) The principle index the United States used to chart success in Vietnam was

1.   A) the movement of the front line and the capture of key geographical objectives.

2.   B) a sophisticated measurement of the proportion of loyal to rebellious peasants.

3.   C) the strength and stability of the South Vietnamese government.

4.   D) the “body count.”

5.   E) the number of non-combatants arrested.

 

Answer:  D

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12) The American attrition strategy

1.   A) was so destructive that North Vietnam proved unable to replace its losses.

2.   B) quickly turned the tide and gave the United States the strategic advantage.

3.   C) permitted General Westmoreland to put the enemy on the defensive and thereby allowed him to shift forces to the key task of pacification.

4.   D) rapidly decimated the critical NLF political infrastructure.

5.   E) proved able to achieve no more than a stalemate.

 

Answer:  E

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13) With the Americanization of the war in 1965, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

1.   A) became more dependent than ever on the U.S.

2.   B) underwent a period of intensive retooling from which it emerged stronger than ever.

3.   C) was divided into small units that were then integrated into the American command under a system pioneered during the Korean War.

4.   D) shrank dramatically in size to become a highly mobile, elite striking force.

5.   E) undertook a series of spoiler attacks into North Vietnam that threw the enemy off balance.

 

Answer:  A

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14) In 1966, Nguyen Cao Ky solidified his political position by

1.   A) having Nguyen Van Thieu assassinated.

2.   B) secretly negotiating with the NLF.

3.   C) holding and winning legitimate, free elections.

4.   D) sending South Vietnamese Marines to Da Nang to put down a Buddhist rebellion.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  D

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15) The Revolutionary Development (RD) program suffered from all of the following EXCEPT

1.   A) difficulties recruiting sufficient personnel.

2.   B) attacks on RD cadre by NLF guerrillas.

3.   C) bureaucratic problems and insufficient funding.

4.   D) boorish behavior by nearby ARVN units that undercut the program’s good work.

5.   E) the efforts of top South Vietnamese officials to turn the RD program into a conduit for lucrative diamond smuggling.

 

Answer:  E

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16) The Americanization of the war that began in 1965

1.   A) made an estimated 4 million Vietnamese refugees in their own country.

2.   B) fueled severe crime and corruption.

3.   C) led to an explosion of prostitution and to the creation of seedy bar districts.

4.   D) undermined South Vietnam’s fragile economy.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:E

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17) North Vietnam’s diplomatic position—the Four Points—conditioned negotiations on

1.   A) the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from all of Southeast Asia, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, free elections, and amnesty for all NLF members.

2.   B) a development loan of $2 billion dollars, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, American acceptance of Peaceful Coexistence, and the end of the strategic hamlet program.

3.   C) the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.

4.   D) the immediate reunification of Vietnam.

5.   E) All of these.

 

Answer:  C

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18) Antiwar liberals opposed American participation in the war for all of the following reasons EXCEPT

1.   A) their belief that the employment of weapons such as napalm was inhumane.

2.   B) their conviction that America had betrayed its bedrock principles by supporting a corrupt and repressive regime in South Vietnam.

3.   C) their conclusion that U.S. escalation violated a number of international agreements including the United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords.

4.   D) their doubts in the validity of the domino theory on which the Johnson Administration justified intervention.

5.   E) their conviction that war and military action was morally wrong under any circumstances.

 

Answer:  E

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19) According to the author, the antiwar movement

1.   A) compelled a debate that eventually led policymakers and the public to consider withdrawing.

2.   B) almost single-handedly forced the U.S. to deescalate its involvement in Vietnam.

3.   C) turned the American people against the war and thus encouraged a wavering North Vietnamese government to press on toward victory.

4.   D) had no impact whatsoever on the course of the war.

5.   E) divided America to the point that a civil war nearly erupted in the summer of 1967.

 

Answer:  A

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20) In the summer of 1967, General William Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1.   A) admitted that their program had failed and consequently called for a return to the enclave strategy.

2.   B) asked for 200,000 additional troops, a limited call up of the reserves, and an escalation of the war.

3.   C) demanded a declaration of war designed to rally the American people behind continued involvement.

4.   D) asked President Johnson to seek a diplomatic solution to the war.

5.   E) resigned to protest the President’s refusal to call up the reserves or provide the troops they believed necessary to achieve victory.

 

Answer:  B

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21) By the summer of 1967, the chief opponent within the Johnson Administration to the continuation of the Vietnam War was

1.   A) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

2.   B) Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

3.   C) Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles.

4.   D) Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

5.   E) Senator Ted Kennedy.

 

Answer:  D

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22) The San Antonio peace formula

1.   A) conditioned America’s willingness to negotiate on the prior withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam.

2.   B) indicated Washington’s willingness to pull all of its ground troops out of South Vietnam in exchange for the start of meaningful negotiations.

3.   C) made clear America’s willingness to stop the bombing campaign “with the understanding” that meaningful discussions would follow.

4.   D) amounted to a complete repudiation of Washington’s prior goal of maintaining a non-Communist South Vietnam.

5.   E) was designed to appease the antiwar movement at home and did not reflect a meaningful change in America’s bargaining position.

 

Answer:  C

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23) The CIA’s Operation CHAOS

1.   A) was illegal and a violation of the agency’s charter.

2.   B) uncovered links between Hanoi and the peace movement.

3.   C) provided overwhelming evidence that most major antiwar groups were under the direct control of the USSR.

4.   D) was an ugly but necessary action during time of war.

5.   E) effectively broke the back of the NLF’s political organization in the Mekong Delta.

 

Answer: A

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24) WagingPeace- Please read the exchange of letters between American President Lyndon Johnson and North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh that took place in February 1967:

 

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1967-vietnam-letters1.html.

 

1.   What recent North Vietnamese statements spurred President Johnson to initiate this peace initiative? What difficulties did Johnson believe were inherent in the North Vietnamese proposal?

2.   What proposal did President Johnson make to break the diplomatic logjam and to start meaningful negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States?

3.   In his response to President Johnson, which nation did President Ho Chi Minh cast as the aggressor in the Vietnam War? In general, how did he characterize the conflict? Explain.

4.   Was there any common ground in the two leaders’ proposals? Whose proposal do you find more reasonable? Why?

5.   If you were President of North Vietnam, would you have pursued a more conciliatory diplomatic line than President Ho Chi Minh? Explain.

 

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